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Biological Warfare
The following is a summary of testimony presented by 
Joshua Lederberg on August 24, 2001, to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, Senator Joseph R. Biden, Chair. This tes-
timony is particularly pertinent in view of the recent terror-
ist attacks and subsequent episodes of anthrax. 
Dr. Lederberg, a research geneticist, is past president 
and Sackler Foundation Scholar, The Rockefeller University. 
He was a pioneer in the field of bacterial genetics with the 
discovery of genetic recombination in bacteria. In 1958, at 
the age of 33, Dr. Lederberg received the Nobel Prize in Med-
icine for this work and subsequent research on bacterial 
genetics. Since 1966, he has been concerned about the poten-
tial abuse of microbiology and has advised government agen-
cies about its control. In 1989 he was honored with the 
National Medal of Science by President George H.W. Bush, 
who cited his role as consultant. Dr. Lederberg is cochair of a 
study on biological weapon threats and defensive measures 
tasked by the Defense Science Board and the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency. He is also the editor of “Biological Weap-
ons: Containing the Threat,” published by MIT Press in 
1999.
I am honored to address the committee on a matter of 
transcendent importance to U.S. security and global human 
welfare. I define biological warfare as use of agents of dis-
ease for hostile purposes. This definition encompasses 
attacks on human health and survival and extends to plant 
and animal crops. Biological warfare was the focus of billion-
dollar investments by the United States and the former 
Soviet Union until President Nixon's unilateral abjuration in 
1969. This declaration was followed by the negotiation, rati-
fication, and coming into force (in 1975) of the Biological 
Weapons Convention, a categorical ban on the development, 
production, and use of biological weapons. 
Biological weapons are characterized by low cost and 
ease of access; difficulty of detection, even after use, until 
disease has advanced; unreliable but open-ended scale of 
predictable casualties; and clandestine stockpiles and deliv-
ery systems. Per kilogram of weapon, the potential lives lost 
approach those of nuclear weapons, but less costly and 
sophisticated technology are required.
Intelligence estimates indicate that up to a dozen coun-
tries may have developed biological weapons. Considerable 
harm (on the scale of 1,000 casualties) could be inflicted by 
rank amateurs. Terrorist groups, privately or state-spon-
sored, with funds up to $1 million, could mount massive 
attacks of 10 or 100 times that scale. For each 1,000 persons 
on the casualty roster, 100,000 or 1,000,000 are at risk and 
in need of prophylactic attention, which in turn necessitates 
a massive triage. Studies of hypothetical scenarios document 
the complexity of managing bioterrorist incidents and the 
stress that control of such incidents would impose on civil 
order.
While powerful nations maintain a degree of equilib-
rium through mutual deterrence and shared interests, less 
powerful elements may find in biological warfare opportuni-
ties to harm their enemies. Under current levels of prepared-
ness (e.g., physical facilities and organization and 
operational doctrines), biological warfare is probably the 
most perplexing and gravest security challenge we face.
President Nixon's abjuration of biological warfare as a 
U.S. military weapon in 1969 set in motion the most impor-
tant diplomatic and legal steps towards its eradication glo-
bally, laying the groundwork for the Biological Weapons 
Convention treaty. The treaty lacks robust verification mech-
anisms, mainly for reasons intrinsic to the technology. How-
ever, verification is not the foundation of the U.S. stance; the 
United States has long since abandoned the idea that it 
would respond in kind to such an attack. Were it not for the 
Biological Weapons Convention, a gradually escalating tech-
nology race would have amplified even further this threat to 
human existence. The treaty does set a consensually agreed-
upon standard of behavior: it has become institutionalized 
into international law, and infractions open the door to 
enforcement.
Although further provisions for verification would do lit-
tle to enhance our knowledge of those infractions, they would 
nevertheless have important symbolic value in reaffirming 
international commitment to the principles of the treaty. 
Creative leadership is needed to develop other ways to 
strengthen that reaffirmation. The real problem with the 
Biological Weapons Convention is enforcement, not verifica-
tion. We have all-but-certain knowledge that Saddam Hus-
sein has continued Iraq's biological weapons development 
program. To convince our allies, much less neutral nations 
and potential adversaries, of what is at stake, we may have 
to elevate the priority we give to this threat. We must also 
become more knowledgeable about the local political and cul-
tural terrain and more ingenious in designing sanctions that 
will not impose undue hardship on the Iraqi population. Our 
public diplomacy is predicated on the stated proposition that 
use of biological weapons is an offense to civilization. This 
major accomplishment of the Biological Weapons Convention 
needs to be reaffirmed both in the attention we give to our 
own defense and in our stern responses to substantial infrac-
tions from any quarter. 
Unlike the aftermath of nuclear or high-explosive bom-
bardment, attack with biological weapons is amenable to 
interventions for some hours or days after the event, depend-
ing on the agent used. With the most publicized agent, 
anthrax, administration of appropriate antibiotics can pro-
tect the majority of those exposed. The other side of the coin 
is recognizing the syndrome within hours of the earliest 
symptoms. Biosensors are being developed to confirm suspi-
cions of anthrax. We will have to rely on early diagnosis of 
the first human (or animal) cases to provide the basis for 
focusing those sensors. Because a wide list of diseases must 
be considered, this surveillance entails reinvigorating our 
overall public health infrastructure. In contrast to the explo-
sive rise of health-care expenditures, public health funding 
has been allowed to languish, boosted only very recently by 
public arousal about emerging infections and bioterrorism. 
That boost entails personnel and organizational structures, 
but improvement also depends on funding for new as well as 
established programs.
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In addition to diagnostic capability, we need organiza-
tional and operational doctrines that can confront 
unprecedented emergencies, we need trained personnel on 
call, and we need physical facilities for isolation, decontami-
nation, and care. We also need stockpiles of antibiotics and 
vaccines appropriate to the risk, preceded by careful analysis 
of what kinds and how much. We need research on treatment 
methods (e.g., how should inhalational anthrax be managed 
with possibly limited supplies of antibiotics). Still more fun-
damental, research could give us sharper tools for diagnosis 
and more usable ranges of antibacterial and antiviral 
remedies.
Organizing the government to deal with mass contin-
gencies is a goal that is vexing and still poorly addressed. It 
entails coordination of local, state, and federal assets and 
jurisdictions and the intersection of law enforcement, 
national security, and public health. A time of crisis is not 
ideal for debates over responsibility, authority, and funding. 
Our main bulwark against direct large-scale attack is 
the combination of civic harmony and firm retaliation. Bet-
ter intelligence is key to retaliation, apprehension, and penal 
containment and sanctions. This territory is technically 
unfamiliar to most of the intelligence community, which has 
taken many positive steps but has a long way to go. 
Resources for managing biological threats are fewer than 
those allocated to other, more familiar threats.
I have already alluded to public diplomacy (starting 
with firm conviction at home) about the level of priority to be 
given to the biological weapons threat if a successful attack 
is to be averted. A dilemma is how to study the threats of bio-
warfare in detail and develop vaccines and other counter-
measures, while maintaining the policy of abhorrence at the 
idea of using disease as a weapon. The central premise of the 
Biological Weapons Convention is that infectious disease is 
the common enemy of all humans and that joining with that 
enemy is an act of treason against humanity. This premise 
clearly inspired adherence to the Convention, even by coun-
tries that might otherwise exploit biological weapons to level 
the playing field against a superpower. Having set aside bio-
logical weapons as of small advantage to U.S. military power, 
we are fortunate that we share the treaty=s interests and 
conclusions. They can only be strengthened if we internalize 
them and participate ever more fully in global campaigns for 
health. Current levels of funding for AIDS, malaria, and 
tuberculosis are small but are certainly steps in the right 
direction. We should assume leadership among nations coop-
erating with the World Health Organization to bolster global 
systems of surveillance and outbreak investigation of dis-
eases that could threaten us all.
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International Conference on
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2002
The National Center for Infectious Diseases,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, has
scheduled the Third International Conference on
Emerging Infectious Diseases for March 24-27,
2002, at the Hyatt Regency Hotel, Atlanta, Georgia,
USA. More than 2,500 participants are expected,
representing many nations and disciplines. They
will discuss the latest information on many aspects
of new and reemerging pathogens, such as West Nile
virus and issues concerning bioterrorism.
Conference information is available
at http://www.cdc.gov/iceid
 The Call for Abstracts is available
at http://www.asmusa.org/mtgscr/iceido2.htm
Contact person is Charles Schable, cas1@cdc.gov